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THE UNIFORM ACT ON DECLARATORY
R-D GMENTS
T HE National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws at its session in St. Louis in August, 192o, approved
the first draft of a Uniform Act on Declaratory Judgments. At
the next session of the Conference in 1921 the Act will probably
receive final approval and be recommended to legislatures for
enactment. The importance of the recommendations of this august
body in promoting the enactment of legislation in our states war-
rants some comment upon the draft they have approved.
Although a few instances of statutory authorization for the
rendering of declaratory judgments may be found in our state legis-
lation prior to 1918, such as the California Act of 185o,l the Rhode
Island Act of 1876,2 the New Jersey Act of i915,' the Connecticut
1 CAL m oNIA PRAcrIcE AcT, § 527: "An action may be brought by one person
against another, for the purpose of determining an adverse claim which the latter
makes against the former, for money or property, upon an alleged obligation." See
King v. Hall, 5 Cal. 83 (1855). Cf. the action of jactitation, still used in many coun-
tries adopting the civil law, 28 YALE L. J. I, 20.
2 R oDE ISLAND, Acrs & RESOLVES, I876, ch. 563, § 17, GEN. LAWS r9o9, ch. 289,
§ ig: "No suit in equity shall be defeated on the ground that a mere declaratory decree
is sought; and the court may make binding declarations of right in equity, without
granting consequential relief." In Hanley v. Wetmore, 15 R. I. 386, 6 At. 777 (1886),
this was construed narrowly, like the English Act of 1852 (28 YALE L. J. 26), and was
deemed to require the existence of a possibility of obtaining coercive relief, which
merely is not claimed. Sections 20-22 of the GENERAL LAWS of i909 deal with dec-
larations on the construction of written instruments; they have been used principally
for the construction of wills.
NEW JERSEY, LAWS 1915, ch. 1i6, § 7, P. 185: "Subject to rules, any person
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Act of 1915,4 and other isolated cases, 5 it was not until 1918 that
the movement acquired renewed momentum in the United States
and now seems destined to sweep the country.6  Within the last
claiming a right cognizable in a court of equity, under a deed, will, or other
written instrument, may apply for the determination of any question of construc-
tion thereof, in so far as the same affects such a right, and for a declaration of
the rights of the persons interested." This statute is based, not on the broad
power granted to the English courts under Supreme Court Rules of 1883, Order
XXV, rule 5, but on the more restricted provisions of the rule of 1893,
Order LIV, A.
This also is the basis of the Florida Act of igg, LAws 1919, ch. 7,857 (No. 75),
p. 148, which adds the words "or corporation" after "any person." See In re Un-
garo's Will, 88 N. J. Eq. 25, 102 Atl. 244 (1917); Renwick v. Hay, 90 N. J. Eq. 148,
io6 AtI. 547 (gig); Mayor of Bayonne v. East Jersey Water Co., io8 Atl. (N. J. Eq.)
121 (I919), 29 YALE L. J. 545-549. The English Order XXV, rule 5, of 1883, reads:
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on the ground that a merely
declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the Court may make binding
declarations of right, whether any consequential relief is, or could be claimed, or not."
Order LIV, A, of 1893, reads: "In any Division of the High Court, any person
claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may
apply by originating summons for the determination of any question of construc-
tion arising under the instrument, and for a declaration of the rights of the persons
interested."
4 Cox iccuT, PuB. AcTS, i915, ch. 174, § 1, 2 GEw. STAT. I918, § Si3: "An
action may be brought by any person claiming . . . any interest in . . . real or per-
sonal property . . . against any person who may claim . . . any interest . . . ad-
verse to the plaintiff . . . for the purpose of determining such adverse . . . interest
. and to clear up all doubts and disputes, and to quiet and settle the title to the
same." See Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 90 Conn. 63, 96 At]. 149
(i915), 91 Conn. 5oo, 5o6, Ioo Adt. 22 (1917), where the court, Case, J., was most
reluctant to admit the fact that this statute was in effect analogous to the English
Order XXV, rule 5.
5 See references to various statutes and decisions which may be deemed to have
authorized or involved declaratory judgments in 28 YALE L. J. 1, 3, 30-32; and in man-
uscript brief of Professor Edson R. Sunderland as amicus curiae in the case of Anway v.
Grand Rapids Ry., 179 N. W. (Mich.) 350 (1920).
6 Sunderland, "A Modem Evolution in Remedial Rights - the Declaratory judg-
ment," 16 Mica. L. Rav. 69 (1917); Borchard, "The Declaratory Judgment -a
Needed Procedural Reform," 28 YALE L. J. I, io5 (1918); Sunderland, "The Courts
as Authorized Legal Advisers of the People," 54 AomE. L. REv. i61 (1920); "The
Declaratory Judgment," 20 CoL. L. REv. io6 (1920); Harrison, "The Declaratory
Judgment in California," 8 CAL. L. REv. 133 (1920); Kerr, "Declaration of Rights
without Consequential Relief," 53 AMR. L. REv. i6i (1919); Vinje, "Declaratory
Relief," 4 MARQuETTE L. Rav. ro6 (1920); Borchard, "Recent Declaratory judg-
ments," 29 YALE L. J. 545 (1920); Schoonmaker, "Declaratory judgment," 5 MINN.
L. REv. 32 (1920); Dodd, "Progress of Preventive Justice," 6 Ar. BAR AssN. J.
151 (Nov., 1920); Gates, "Declaratory Relief," PROCEEDnGs OF TENNESSEE BAR
ASSN. 41 (1920); Medina, "Some Phases of the New York Civil Practice Act and.
Rules," 21 COLUMBIA L. REv. 113 (1921).
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two years Michigan,7 Wisconsin," Florida,9 New York,10 and Kan-
sas " have empowered their courts, with varying limitations, to
7 MicHIGAN PUBLIC ACTS igig, No. 15o, P. 278:
"Section i. No action or proceeding in any court of record shall be open to objec-
tion on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment, decree or order is sought
thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of rights whether any conse-
quential relief is or could he claimed, or not, including the determination, at the in-
stance of anyone claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other written instru-
ment, of any question of construction arising under the instrument and a declaration
of the rights of the parties interested.
"Sec. 2. Declarations of rights and determinations of questions of construction,
as herein provided for, may be obtained by means of ordinary proceedings at law or
in equity, or by means of a petition on either the law or equity side of the court, as the
nature of the case may require, and where a declaration of rights is the only relief
asked, the case may be noticed for early hearing, as in the case of a motion.
"Sec. 3. Where further relief based upon a declaration of rights shall become neces-
sary or proper after such declaration has been made, application may be made by
petition to any court having jurisdiction to grant such relief, for an order directed to
any party or parties whose rights have been determined by such declaration, to show
cause why such further relief should not be granted forthwith, upon such reasonable
notice as shall be prescribed by the court in the said order.
"Sec. 4. When a declaration of rights, or the granting of further relief based thereon,
shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable by a jury, such issues may be
submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories, with such instructions by the court
as may be proper, whether a general verdict be rendered or required or not, and such
interrogatories and answers shall constitute a part of the record of the case.
"Sec. 5. Unless the parties shall agree by stipulation as to the allowance thereof,
costs in proceedings authorized by this act shall be allowed in accordance with such
special rules as the supreme court may make, and in the absence of such rules, the
practice followed in ordinary cases at law or in equity shall be followed, wherever
applicable, and when not applicable, the costs or such part thereof as to the court may
seem just, in view of the particular circumstances of the case, may be awarded to
either party.
"Sec. 6. This act is declared to be remedial, and is to be liberally construed and lib-
erally administered with a view to making the courts more serviceable to the people."
The Act of Kansas, approved February 17, 1921, is modeled upon the Michigan
Act. See ig MicH. L. REv. 537, 7 AmmR. BAR ASSN. J. 107 (Mar., 1921).
8 WiscoNsmn, LAWS I919, ch. 242, § 2687 In., p. 253: "Equitable actions to obtain
declaratory relief may be brought and maintained in the circuit court, and in matters
of which the supreme court has original jurisdiction in the supreme court, and it shall
be no objection to the maintenance of such an action that no consequential relief is
sought or can be granted if it appears that substantial doubt or controversy exists
9 FLORIA, LAWS I919, ch. 7857, No. 75, P. 148. This Act resembles closely the
New Jersey Act of I915, quoted supra, note 3.
10 Civil Practice Act I919, § 473, Nnw YoRK LAws, 1920, ch. 925, P. 172: "The
supreme court shall have power in any action or proceeding to declare rights and other
legal relations on request for such declaration whether or not further relief is or could
be claimed, and such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. Such pro-
visions shall be made by rules as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect
the provisions of this section."
The bill pending in Connecticut is practically identical with the New York Act; so
also is the federal bill conferring this power on federal courts of equity.
11 Act of February 17, 1921, printed in ig MIcH. L. REv. 538, and 7 AaR. BAR
AsSN. J. 107 (Mar. 1921).
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render declaratory judgmefits, and the legislative sessions of 1921
will doubtless add several other states to the list. No organized
as to the rights or duties of parties, and that either public or private interests will be
materially promoted by a declaration of the right or duty in advance of any actual or
threatened invasion of right or default in duty. The judgment rendered in such an
action shall bind all the parties thereto and be conclusive and final as to the rights
and duties involved." See the discussion of this statute by Justice Vinje of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in 4 MARQOuET L. Rnv. io6 (1920). The Wisconsin Act curi-
ously seems to confine its authority to the making of declarations "in advance of any
actual or threatened invasion of right or default in duty." There is no reason thus to
restrict the scope of the power, for declarations ought to be made as well after a wrong
has been committed. Possibly the limitation was unintentional; it can be cured by
amendment.
The amendment proposed by the Massachusetts Judicature Commission to chap-
ter 214 of the GENERAL LAWS, follows in substance the Wisconsin Act. It reads as
follows:
AN ACT TO EsTABLSH PROCEDURE FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Be it enacted, etc., as follows:
Section three of chapter two hundred and fourteen of the General Laws is hereby
amended by adding at the end thereof the following: - (ir) Equitable actions to
obtain declaratory relief, in which it shall be no objection to the maintenance of such
action that no consequential relief is sought or can be granted, if it appears that sub-
stantial doubt exists as to the alleged rights or duties of parties, [or] that an actual
controversy has arisen as to such rights or duties which cannot be settled in any pend-
ing suit, and that either public or private interests will be materially promoted by a
declaration of right or duty in advance of any actual or threatened invasion of right or
default in duty. The judgment rendered in such an action shall bind all parties thereto
and be conclusive as to the rights and duties involved. [italics mine]
Possibly the word "or," inserted by the writer in brackets, was unintentionally
omitted. If not, the Act is seriously defective in making an "actual controversy" a
condition precedent. This would deprive the declaratory judgment of some of its
most useful functions in resolving doubts and uncertainties in legal relations before a
controversy has arisen or where a controversy merely may arise. SECOND AND FiNAL
REPORT OF THE 'MASSAciUsETTs JUDIcATURE ComasusSIoN, Jan., 1921, House No.
1205, Pp- 113, 154.
For the same reason, the Amendment to the federal bill (§ 4808) proposed by the
Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the American Bar Association, to
meet the objection of the Michigan Supreme Court in the Anway case, namely, "when
there is an actual controversy between the parties," is greatly to be regretted. Not
only does it give undue weight to an absurd decision, but it restricts unnecessarily a
common function of the declaratory judgment. All that English and other courts have
required is a serious doubt or a potential controversy. See 7 AmER. BARAssN. J., p.62
(Feb., 192x). The same criticism may be directed to the recent Act of Kansas, ap-
proved February 17, 1921; the clause in section 6 to the effect that it is the purpose of
the Act "to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies
over legal rights" was probably not well thought out. The procedure for the removal
of clouds from title, which bears close resemblance to one phase of declaratory judg-
ment procedure, does not necessarily require an "actual controversy" (Kansas Act,
section i). The defect is hardly cured by the attempted definition of "actual con-
troversy" in the Kansas Act, namely, "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of
right." 7 AimER. BAR ASsN. J. 107 (Mar., X921).
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propaganda is responsible for the general acceptance and wide-
spread adoption of this procedural reform; its intrinsic merits in
effecting the removal of clouds from legal relations, in simplifying
the adjudication of contested issues, and in preventing rather than
merely curing legal injury and the accrual of damages, have served
to gain for ii the almost spontaneous approval of Bar associations
and legislative committees. The movement has been imfeasur-
ably aided by the fact that the reforms promised are not confined
to the realm of theory or speculation but have had the case-hard-
ened test of nearly fifty years of British and continental judicial
experience. While the practice of rendering judgments on con-
tested issues of law or fact, without further coercive relief in the
form of money damages, injunction, etc., goes back to the Roman
law, 2 its appeal to the American Bar has been based largely upon
the fact that other countries having relatively the same industrial,
economic, and social development as our own have found the de-
claratory judgment increasingly useful as an instrument of pre-
ventive and remedial justice. Wherever the procedure has been
adopted, it has constantly grown in favor and utility. If history is
any guide, therefore, it justifies the belief that the procedure for
declaratory relief will soon be adopted by most of our states, and
will be used to the same extent that it now is in England and many
of its colonies and in several countries of continental Europe. The
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, doubtless anticipating the
rapid spread of the movement, have sought to regularize it by
the recommendation of a uniform statute. Whether the Uniform
Act can be adopted in the various states without amendment' or
qualification remains to be seen.
Before commenting upon the draft of the Uniform Act, it may
be well to note the apparent obstacle to the extension of the reform
interposed by a recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court
holding unconstitutional the Michigan Act authorizing the courts
of that state to render declaratory judgments.3 The ground of
the decision was that the rendering of declaratory judgments was
not the exercise of "judicial power" in a constitutional sense, be-
cause the judgment was not followed by an executory decree for
damages, injunction, etc., and because the courts cannot be con-
12 28 YALE L. J. i, io el seq. (i9i8).
11 Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry., i79 N. NV. (Mich.) 350 (1920).
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stitutionally empowered to decide moot cases or render advisory
opinions or judgments not final. Several of the leading law jour-
nals, which have assumed the important function of examining
critically the decisions of the courts from the standpoint of their
adherence to law and principle, have been unanimous in condemn-
ing the Michigan decision as devoid of foundation in lw or reason.14
Indedd, while the case presented to the court was probably inap-
propriate for a declaratory judgment, as there was no issue or dif-
ference of opinion between the parties,15 no justification was thereby
afforded for the court's adventure into the domain of the irrelevant,
especially as their essay, in seeking support for an undisguised
prejudice, involved an inexcusable confusion of ideas between the
declaratory judgment and the advisory opinion, the moot case and
the judgment not final. Every reviewer of the decision, as well as
the minority opinion in the case, has pointed out the court's funda-
mental misconceptions in ignoring the most obvious distinctions,
and hence in mistaking the essence of judicial power and of the
declaratory judgment. It seems hardly likely, therefore, that the
decision will be followed in any other jurisdiction or that it will
ultimately survive in Michigan itself.
The most notable feature of the draft of the Uniform Act is its
length. It contains fourteen sections, whereas the longest of the stat-
utes already passed, that of Michigan, contains but six; and in several
states, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and New York, one section has been
deemed sufficient to confer on the courts the power to render declar-
atory judgments. Florida's statute covers three sections, of which the
first grants the power, the second provides for the making of court
rules, and the third prescribes the date of its coming into force.
The effective part of the Uniform Act granting to the courts the
power to make declarations is section one, which reads:
"SECTION i. Scope. The Courts of this State having jurisdiction
in equity, shall have power in any suit in equity or in any independent
or interlocutory proceeding, to declare rights and other legal relations
on written request for such declaration, whether or not further relief is
or could be claimed; and such declaration shall have the force of a final
judgment or decree."
14 ig Mica. L. REv. 86, 30 YALE L. J. i6I, 21 COLUMBIA L. REv. i68, 5 MINN. L.
REv. 172, 6 Am. BAR ASSN. J. 145 (Nov. 1920), 7 ibid. 141 (Mar., 1921).
15 The facts of the case are presented in the comments cited in note 14.
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This language is almost identical with section 473 of the New
York Practice Act, which comes into effect.April I, 1921,11 and
with the bill now pending in the Connecticut legislature and in
the federal Congress. The differences are as follows: the Uniform
Act confers the power on courts "having jurisdiction in equity."
The Wisconsin Act also provides for "equitable actions." In New
York and Connecticut, where one court has jurisdiction in law and
in equity, it was unnecessary to make a distinction in forum or
form of action. But as the Uniform Act looks to states having
separate courts of law and equity, and inasmuch as both legal and
equitable relief can be granted by a declaration, the restriction of
the forum to courts "having jurisdiction in equity" would seem
to have been induced by considerations looking to facilities in trial
procedure, the discretionary nature of the relief making it more
appropriate to equity jurisdiction. A special verdict on disputed
issues of fact may be taken by the court on submission to a jury."'
That both legal and equitable relief may be granted is indicated by
the fact that the request for a declaration may be made "in any
suit in equity or in any independent or interlocutory proceeding."
The absence of the word "independent" from the New York Act
and from the Connecticut bill has given rise to the question whether
a hostile court might not interpret the provision that the court
shall have power to declare rights "in any action or proceeding"
to mean that such power exists only as incidental to actions or
proceedings already begun and not in an independent proceeding
especially brought to obtain a declaratory judgment. Such an
interpretation would be distinctly contrary to the intention of the
draftsmen, which contemplated the broadest methods of requesting
declarations, both as incidental to actions or proceedings seek-
ing a coercive judgment and in independent proceedings in which
nothing but a declaration is sought. This appears more clearly from
the clause "whether or not further relief is or could be claimed,"
and from the section of the New York Practice Act which provides
that "This Act shall be liberally construed," 18 as well as from the
16 Supra, note io.
17 Section io of the Uniform Act. Of the six rules adopted by the New York
Supreme Court to carry into effect section 473 of the Civil Practice Act, one
(Rule 213) provides for the taking of the special verdict of a jury to settle questions
of fact.
18 The Uniform Act (§ 12) contains a similar provision.
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terms of Rule 2io which provides that "in matters of procedure . . .
the forms and practice prescribed in the civil practice act and rules
for other actions" in the supreme court, shall be followed, and of
Rule 212 which enables the court to decline a declaration in its dis-
cretion if it believes "the parties should be left to relief by existing
forms of actions." (italics mine)
The first clause of section one of the Uniform Act providing for
equitable jurisdiction may have to be modified in states having no
separate courts of equity. In any event, to preclude doubt on the
question whether suits at law may be brought for a declaration,
the section might be amended to read: "in any suit at law or in
equity or in any independent or interlocutory proceeding."
The clause "to declare rights and other legal relations," also in-
corporated in the New York Act and in the Connecticut and federal
bills, was induced by the fact that "rights" is a term used with
various meanings. The effort of an English court to restrict it to
its correct meaning, namely, a legally sustainable claim to the per-
formance of a duty by another, nearly served to bar the suit for a
declaration by the Guaranty Trust Company that they were not
under a duty to repay Hannay and Company certain sums of money
which Hannay had advanced on certain forged bills of lading. They
really sought, therefore, not a declaration of right but of freedom
from duty, i. e. privilege. Only by the most technical construction
of two clauses of Order XXV, Rule 5, did the English Court of
Appeal, by a majority of one, decide to make the declaration re-
quested. 9 Inasmuch as it seems clear that "right" is but one of
several jural relations which the court is empowered to declare, it
seems preferable by exactness of language to forestall the diffi-
culties which might arise, as they did in England, out of the use
of the loose and broad term "rights," although no court should
construe this so narrowly and literally as to exclu.de duty, privilege,
no-right, power, liability, immunity, disability.20 The assumption
that the term "and other legal relations" was intended to cover
the declaration of such relations of status, involving complex jural
19 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay (C. A.), [1915] 2 K. B. 536, 574 The case
is more fully discussed in 28 YALE L. J. 1, 9 (i918).
20 The Hohfeld tables of jural relations, to the dear analysis of which the declara-
tory action is peculiarly adaptable, are described in the valuable articles of the late
Professor Hohfeld in 23 YALE L. J. i6 (i9i3), and 26 ibid., 710 (1917); also in two
notable articles by Professor Arthur L. Corbin: "Legal Analysis and Terminology," 29
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(legal) relations, as owner, wife, partner, agent, etc., is not well
founded, although there is no reason to exclude these from the
jurisdiction conferred by the term "legal relations.';
The last clause, "such declaration shall have the force of a final
judgment or decree," clearly indicates its dissimilarity from the
advisory opinion or the judgment not final.
The subsequent sections of the Uniform Act are concerned with
a detailed prescription of rules of construction, procedure, and
practice. There are twelve different sections, and while the second,
which provides for the declaration of rights "or duties" under the
construction of written instruments, may be deemed a proper ex-
tension, by specific description, of the more general power conferred
in section one, most of the other sections cover rules which ordi-
narily would be incorporated in rules of court. The elaboration of
these rules in the Uniform Act is explained by the Chairman of the
Committee, Judge Caton, a distinguished leader of the Virginia
Bar, by the fact that many states, especially in the South, do not
confer on their courts any rule-making authority. In such states,
therefore, the rules would have to be embodied in the statute. In
New York, six simple rules were adopted by the Supreme Court to
give effect to the Act, and in most states giving their courts the
power to make rules the general power embraced in section one of
the Uniform Act, together with rules such as have been adopted in
New York,21 would probably suffice. It will be recalled that the
ibid., 163 (igig), and "Jural Relations and their Classification," 30 ibid., 226 (1921).
For the sake of completeness, they may be presented here:
Jural: right privilege power immunity
Opposites: no-right duty disability liability
Jural: right privilege power immunity
Correlatives: duty no-right liability disability
2 The New York rules to carry into effect § 473 of the Civil Practice Act are as
follows (Wilson, Civil Practice Manual of the State of New York, "Rules"):
"TITLE 25-DEcLARATORY JUDGMENTS
"RULE 210. PRACTICE AssnIATED. An action in the supreme court to obtain a
declaratory judgment, pursuant to section four hundred and seventy-three of the civil
practice act, in matters of procedure shall follow the forms and practice prescribed in
the civil practice act and rules for other actions in that court.
"RULE 211. PRAYER FOR RELIEF. The prayer for relief in the complaint shall
specify the precise rights and [or?] other legal relations of which a dedaration
is requested and whether further or consequential relief is or could be claimed. If
further relief be claimed in the action, the nature and extent of such relief shall be
stated.
"RUIE 212. JURISDICTIoN DIscRETIONARY. If, in the opinion of the court, the
parties should be left to relief by existing forms of actions, or for other reasons, it may
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present declaratory judgment procedure was adopted in England
in 1883 and 1893 by Rules of Court alone.
Section 2 of the Uniform Act reads:
"SECTION 2. Construction. Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract, or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, municipal ordinance- or franchise, may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute,
ordinance or franchise, and a declaration of rights or duties thereunder."
It will be observed that this section is derived from Order LIV, A,
of the English Rules of 1893 and resembles the New Jersey and
Florida Acts. With the addition of the words "municipal ordi-
nance or franchise" it follows closely the proposed model Rules of
Civil Procedure published by the American Judicature Society.
2
The Michigan Act, very practically, incorporates in its first section
the provisions of sections one and two of the Uniform Act.
The purpose of section two, of course, is to enable parties to
obtain a judicial construction of any written instrument. While
some of our states provide for the construction of wills, very few
go beyond. No power of the courts in England has been more
valuable to business men, especially during the war, than the power
to determine the rights or other legal relations of parties under
contracts. Section one authorizes the declaration of rights and
other legal relations under verbal contracts.
Section two enables the constitutionality of a statute or munici-
pal ordinance to be drawn in question by a declaratory action.
Section five provides for notice to the Attorney General or cor-
poration counsel; and in any event, the relief being discretionary,
and open to denial in the absence of the necessary parties interested
or of sufficient argument, there is no more danger than now of snap
decline to pronounce a declaratory judgment, stating the grounds on which its dis-
cretion is so exercised.
"RULE 213. VERDICTS OF JURY ON FACTS. In order to settle questions of fact
necessary to be determined before judgment can be rendered, the court may direct
their submission to a jury. Such verdict may be taken by the court before which the
action is pending for trial or hearing. The provisions of sections four hundred and
twenty-nine and four hundred and thirty of the civil practice act apply to a verdict so
rendered.
"RuLE 214. CosTs. Costs in such an action shall be discretionary and may be
granted to or against any party to the action.
"RuLE 2x5. APPEAmS. Appeals may be taken in such actions as in other causes."
2BULeTIn XIV. Rules of Civil Procedure, supplementary to the State-wide
judicature Act (BuLLETIN VII-A) of the American Judicature Society, 1g9g. Article
14, Declaratory Relief, § 2, p. 55.
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judgments being rendered on questions of constitutionality. Pos-
sibly the word "franchise," when the franchise is not embodied in
a statute or ordinance, should more properly be inserted after the
word "contract" in line 2, as merely one type of written instrument.
The last clause, "declaration of rights or duties thereunder,"
might be improved by the omission of the words "or duties."
Either this phrase should be replaced by the clause in section one,
."other legal relations," which seems preferable, or else it should
be omitted altogether. In the latter event, the term "rights"
would probably receive the broad construction embracing all jural
relations; whereas if the term "duties" were included, it might
narrow "rights" to its proper technical use, and thus exclude from
the declaration powers, privileges, immunities, etc. Uniformity in
the Act would be better served by maintaining throughout the
form "rights" and/or "other legal relations." The Wisconsin Act,
the California bill, the Massachusetts draft of the Judicature Com-
mission, and the draft of the American Judiature Society are open
to the same criticism.
Section 3 of the Uniform Act reads:
"A contract may be construed before there has been a breach
thereof." This follows section 3 of the proposed Rules of the Amer-
ican Judicature Society, which in turn was influenced by the On-
tario Rule 605. The insertion of this rule of jurisdiction brings
up the question of policy of seeking by statute to limit or define
the broad jurisdiction conferred in sections one and two. The
practice of construing contracts before breach is one of the most
useful functions of the English declaratory judgment procedure,2
and any court acting under the powers conferred by sections one
and two could hardly, in view of the origin and history of those
sections, decline to construe a contract before breach. If the gen-
eral powers of sections one and two are limited by the outline in
later sections of specific fields of jurisdiction, there is danger that
the functions of the court will be restricted to the specific types of
cases provided for and that the growth of this remedial procedure
will be hampered rather than aided. It was this consideration
which persuaded the Supreme Court of New York not to limit the
broad powers conferred in the Act by confining the jurisdiction to
specific subjects, but to permit the procedure to grow empirically.
2 See the cases discussed in 28 YALE L. J., 131 et seq. (1918).
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With forty years of English experience to guide the court, and
jurisdiction being discretionary, it seemed preferable to permit the
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion to dictate the scope of
the remedy. Section 12 of the Uniform Act seeks by express pro-
vision to avoid the danger of a limited construction of the general
powers conferred in section one by reason of an enumeration of
specific powers in other sections.
The provision of the New York Rule 212, by which the court,
when declining in its discretion to make a declaration requested,
must state "the grounds on which its discretion is so exercised,"
enables an appellate court to determine whether the discretion was
properly exercised according to rule; and here the English pre-
cedents are certain to prove a valuable guide.
Section 4 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
"Executor, etc. Any person interested as or through an executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee,
legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a
trust or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic, or insolvent, may
have a declaration of rights or duties in respect thereto.
"(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next
of kin or others; or
"(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees, to do or
abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
"(c) To determine any question arising in the administration of the
estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other
writings or instruments."
With the exception of the final words, "of wills and other writ-
ings or instruments," this section is taken verbatim from the pro-
posed Rules of the American Judicature Society. It has its source
in the English Order 55, rule 3, which it amends and abridges.
The power embraced in this section is now generally exercised by
courts of equity and in several states is expressly conferred. It
enables those occupying fiduciary relationships to obtain judicial
guidance and protection in the performance of their duties and the
exercise of their privileges and powers. Whether it was necessary
to add the phrase "of wills and other writings or instruments" at
the end of the section, seems questionable in view of the provisions
of section 2. The section also includes the clause "rights or duties,"
which has been criticized in the discussion of section 2.
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Section 5 of the Uniform Act reads as follows:
"Parties. When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity
of a statute, the Attorney-General of the state shall, before judgment is
entered, be notified by the party attacking the statute, and shall be
entitled to be heard upon such question. In any proceeding which
involves the validity of a municipal ordinance, the law officer of the mu-
nicipality shall be notified by the party attacking the ordinance or fran-
chise, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. And if the
ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney-
General of the state shall also be notified and be entitled to be heard."
This section is derived from sections 6, 7, and 8 of the draft of
the American Judicature Society. The fact that the joinder of all
parties "who have or claim any interest which would be affected" is
made mandatory, may greatly hamper the extension of the relief. It
would seem advisable to leave such joinder to the discretion of the
court, as is usual in equity cases. The New York Supreme Court
has adopted a much better rule, it would seem, by the broad pro-
vision that "in matters of procedure . . . the forms and practice
prescribed in the civil practice act and rules for other actions"
shall be followed. Relief being always discretionary, the English
courts have felt free to decline the declaration where necessary
parties affected were not joined or heard.24 That persons not
parties to the proceeding shall not be prejudiced thereby hardly
requires express mention. Inasmuch as declaratory relief has re-
ceived a wide extension in England without any such rule as is
embodied in the first sentence of section 5, a rule which might be
construed by a hostile court to limit the relief, it might have been
well to leave such requirement to the ordinary principles of due
process of law and to the discretion of courts exercising equitable
jurisdiction.
Cases involving the constitutionality of statutes or ordinances
are not chosen even now with any view to the presentation of a
fair case testing the statute, but may embody operative facts of
a most unusual kind. Yet upon the haphazard nature of the first
24 Bright v. Tyndall, 4 Ch. D. 189 (32876); Curtis v. Sheffield (C. A.), 21 Ch. D. I, 3
(1882).
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case presented the constitutionality of legislation will often be
determined. There is, therefore, no reason why the declaratory
procedure - an issue with contesting parties appearing - should
not be used as freely to determine the validity or constitutionality
of legislative enactments. The Uniform Act prescribes the neces-
sity for notice to the law officers of the municipality or state, and
opportunity to be heard before such statute or ordinance is held-
invalid or unconstitutional. Such necessity would, in states not
adopting the Uniform Act, and depending on court rules or the
general principles of due process of law, probably be enforced in
the exercise of the court's discretion. There is no harm in making
the requirement express and specific.
Section 6 of the Uniform Act reads:
"Discretionary. The. Court may refuse to exercise the power to de-
clare rights or other legal relations in any proceeding where a decision
under it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave
rise to the proceeding, or in any proceeding where the declaration or con-
strudtion is not necessary, and proper, at the time under all the circum-
stances."
This section is derived from section 4 of the draft of the American
Judicature Society, which in turn was guided by Order LIV, A, rule 4
of the English Supreme Court. That Order, however, applies only
to the construction of written instruments, whereas section 6 covers
all declarations of "rights or other legal relations in any proceed-
ing." For that reason it seems unnecessary to add the words "or
construction" near the end of the section. In New York, Rule 212
expresses the discretionary power of the court more broadly by
providing that "if, in the opinion of the court, the parties should
be left to relief by existing forms of actions, or for other reasons,
it may decline to pronounce a declaratory judgment, stating the
grounds on which its discretion is so exercised." The requirement
for stating grounds preserves the power of appellate courts to re-
view the exercise of the court's discretion and to reverse its action
if not properly exercised under the circumstances; for, as is appar-
ent from the English practice, the discretion is not arbitrary, but is
limited pretty strictly by rule derived from precedents.
While the making of declarations has always been subject to the
court's conceptions, enlightened by a liberal social and judicial
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consciousness, of the utility of the declaration in a particular case,
it was not until the case of Austen v. Collins 2 that an expression
of the court's attitude was announced; the dictum then uttered
was much narrower in its statement of the practice than both the
earlier and the later cases justify. Chitty, J., in that case said:
"The rule leaves it to the discretion of the court to pronounce a de-
claratory judgment when necessary; but it is a power which must be
exercised with great care and jealousy."
It is this formula, with some of the precedents under it, that
section 6 of the Uniform Act seeks to codify. The formula has
traveled to the ends of the world, to Australia, to India, to British
Columbia, to Ontario, and to the state of Connecticut; 28 like most
formulas, affording an opportunity for evading analysis and reason-
ing, it has enabled courts to refuse a declaratory judgment when
they could not justify their action on some better ground. But
the cases show that the discretion is far from arbitrary, and has
been in practice hardened into rule. The declaration has been de-
clined where it will not serve a practical purpose,27 where the court
is without jurisdiction,2 or wlere the law has provided a more
appropriate remedy.29 But where the declaratory action or a
regular action is optional, the English courts practically always
give the plaintiff his choice. The attitude has changed from one
of pronounced conservatism in the rendering of a declaratory judg-
ment to one of enlightened recognition of its value; and if the cases
of the last few years are any criterion, obstacles to its issue are now
avoided rather than sought. The judicial discretion in making
declarations hardly constitutes any greater limitation on the ren-
dering of declaratory judgments than that involved in the exercise
of any other of the well-defined fields of equitable jurisdiction.
Section 7 of the Uniform Act provides:
"Relief, Affirmative or Negative. When dclaratory relief is sought,
the declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect."
21 54 L. T. 9o3, 905 (I886).
26 Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 91 Conn. "50o, 507, ioo At. 22
(1917).
27 Bourgon v. Township of Cumberland, 22 Ont. L. Rep. 256 (1go); Lewis v. Green,
[19o5] 2 Ch. 340. See 28 YALE L. J., 109, x1 (x918).
28 British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mocambique (H. L.), [1893] A. C. 602.
29 N. E. Marine Engineering Co. v. Leeds Forge Co., [i9o6] x Ch. 324. See cases
discussed in 28 YALE L. J. 114 (1918).
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This section was primarily designed to authorize a negative form
of the request for a declaration, e. g., that the plaintiff is under "no
duty" to repay money to the defendant; 3o that the defendant has
"no power" to compel the plaintiff to furnish certain information; 31
that the plaintiffs were under "no liability" to submit to the de-
fendant's exactions.32 These jural relations expressed in negative
form have, of course, their affirmative equivalents, e. g., "no duty"
= privilege, "no power" = disability, "no liability" = immu-
nity. For that reason, it may be deemed unnecessary to include
the section. But some of the continental codes of procedure make
special provision for the declaration in negative form, and it has
thus found its way into the literature and legal thought on the
subject; it may, therefore, be regarded as unobjectionable.
Section 8 of the Uniform Act provides:
"Procedure. Declaratory relief may be obtained by means of the
ordinary process and proceedings in equity, or by means of a request or
petition in equity, as the nature of the case may require, and where a
declaration of rights or other legal relations is the only relief asked, the
case may be noticed for early hearing as in the case of a motion."
This section is derived from section 2 of the Michigan Act, except
that it omits the provision for proceedings at law contained in that
Act. The procedure under the Uniform Act is therefore confined
to the equity side of the court, regardless of the nature of the relief
sought, legal or equitable. In New York, the declaratory judg-
ment procedure has merely been assimilated to the forms and prac-
tice in other actions (rule 210); the prayer for relief, however, must
"specify the precise rights and [or ?] other legal relations of which a
declaration is requested and whether further relief is or could be claimed.
If further relief be claimed in the action, the nature and extent of such
relief shall be stated."
It is not apparent why the plaintiff should be compelled to state
that further relief "could be claimed." If further relief is claimed,
e. g., an injunction, he should of course request it, and it is desirable
that he should be privileged to request it in conjunction with the
declaration; the court should then in its discretion make the dec-
30 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, supra, note Ig.
1 Dyson v. Attorney-General (C. A.), [1912] 1 Ch. i58.
, China Mutual Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. MacLay, [i918] 1 K. B. 33.
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laration even if, for technical reasons, it deems it improper to grant
the coercive relief sought, e. g., injunction. By determining the
legal relations of the parties, injunction or other coercive relief
may indeed become unnecessary, for each party will have had an
authoritative judicial decision of his legal position in the premises.
The combination of the request for a declaration with a prayer for
further relief in one petition has proved valuable in England.
The New York rules have not embodied the provision for "early
hearing as in the case of a motion." This would doubtless have
increased greatly the popularity of this form of recourse.
Section 9 of the Uniform Act provides:
"Executory Relief. Where further relief based upon a declaration of
rights or other legal relations shall become necessary or proper after
such declaration has been made, application may be made on request
or by petition to the Court having jurisdiction to grant such relief for
an order directed to any party or parties whose rights or other legal
relations have been determined by such declaration, to show cause why
such further relief should not be granted forthwith upon such reasonable
notice as shall be prescribed by the Court in its order."
This section is likewise derived from the Michigan Act, and is'
designed to provide for the case of a recalcitrant party who refuses
to conform his conduct to the declaration pronounced by the court.
If further coercive relief, therefore, becomes necessary, this section
is designed to afford it, on an order to show cause. The declara-
tory judgment, of course, is resjudicata as to the substantive legal
relations involved.
The New York rules fail to provide for any ancillary executory
relief after the declaratory judgment has been rendered. Perhaps
the necessity for stating such relief as might be but is not claimed,
is covered by the requirement of stating such "further or conse-
quential relief" as "could be claimed." Whether this is so or not,
'it may well be that by seeking and obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment, the plaintiff is barred from requesting further executory re-
lief if only one cause of action is involved. This thought is aroused
by the case of Haht v.'Sugo,11 where, under the code of civil pro-
cedure, a legal action brought for the recovery of a strip of specific
land was held to bar a subsequent action -in the nature of a suit in
" 16 9 N. Y. iog, 62 N. E. 135 (19o).
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equity to compel the unsuccessful defendant to remove an en-
croaching wall from the-land; the decision was based upon the
ground that the plaintiff should have sought all his relief, legal and
equitable, in one action, there having been but one wrong, and that
the first judgment operated as a bar to the second. Unless the
New York practice avoids this same conclusion with respect to a
declaratory judgment, thereby barring further executory relief,
the new procedure will be considerably limited in its benefit to the
community; for it is very important to a declaratory plaintiff to
know that he has available a means of enforcing a declaratory
judgment in his favor. The obviousness of this conclusion will, it
is hoped, persuade the New York courts, by interpretation or
special rule, to provide for carrying into effect a declaratory judg-
ment, when necessary, on an order to show cause.
In the bill for declaratory judgments recommended to the Cali-
fornia legislature by the California Bar Association, a special section
provides:
"Section 1o62 a. Cumulative. The remedies provided by this chapter
are cumulative and shall not be construed as restricting any other rem-
edy provided by law; and no judgment under this chapter shall preclude
any party from obtaining additional relief based upon the same facts."
Section io of the Uniform Act provides
"Trial by Jury. In any suit or proceeding under this act in which
an issue of fact is involved, and a trial by jury of such issue is required
by the constitution or the laws of this state, such issue may be sub-
mitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories, with such instructions by
the Court as may be proper, whether a general verdict be rendered or
required or not, and such interrogatories and answers shall constitute a
part of the record of the case."
This section is derived from section 4 of the Michigan Act, except
that it leaves the necessity for the submission of issues of fact to a
jury subject to the constitutional requirement in each state. The
Michigan, the New York, and the Uniform Acts do not make such
submission obligatory, but leave it to the court to determine when
the issue of fact, if triable by jury, must be submitted constitu-
tionally. The equitable. nature of the relief would tend to dimin-
ish the number of submissions to a jury, but the requirements of
constitutionality doubtless demand that the courts shall have
THE UNIFORM ACT ON DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 715
power to honor requests for jury trial on issues of fact. The sub-
mission in the form of interrogatories will tend to narrow the issues
and hasten the findings of the jury.
Section ii of the Uniform Act provides:
"Costs. Unless the parties shall agree by stipulation, as to the allow-
ance thereof, costs in proceedings authorized by this act, shall be allowed
in accordance with the rules of practice, followed in proceedings in equity,
wherever applicable, and when not applicable costs or such part thereof
as to the court may seem just, in view of the particular circumstances
of the case, may be awarded to either party, or apportioned between
them."
This section is likewise derived from the Michigan Act (section 5),
but embodies a general rule which would have to be adapted to
the practice in the individual states. In effect, it leaves the allow-
ance of costs to the established practice in each state or to the dis-
cretion of the courts. In New York, Rule 214 provides that costs
"shall be discretionary and may be granted to or against any party
to the action."
Section 12 of the Uniform Act provides:
"Act Remedial, etc. The enumeration of specific powers of the Courts
under this act shall not be held or construed to limit or restrict in any
manner the general powers conferred upon the Courts by the first section
of this act. This act is declared to be remedial, and is to be liberally
construed and liberally administered with the view of making the Courts
more serviceable to the people."
This section was designed to avoid the inference deducible by a
customary rule of construction that the enumeration of specific
powers limited the scope of the general p6wers conferred on the
courts by the first section of 'the Act. These specific powers are
designed merely to furnish a guide to the courts; they constitute
merely codifications of the judicial precedents or rules of court
established in England, where the declaratory judgment has had a
long and increasingly successful career.
The last sentence of the Act is taken almost literally from sec-
tion 6 of the Michigan Act, and is designed to show the legislative
intent that the Act is remedial and is therefore to be liberally con-
strued and administered. Aside from their other grievous errors,
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the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court in the Anway case 3 4
failed entirely to notice or give effect to this section. The New
York Practice Act provides that the entire Act "shall be liberally
construed."
The last section of the Uniform Act, except that relating to the
time when te Act is to come into force, provides:
"Words Construed. The word person wherever used in this act, shall
be construed and held to include and mean any person, partnership,
joint stock company, incorporated association, or society, or municipal
or other corporation of any character whatsoever."
This section is designed to insure a liberal construction to the
word "person" used in sections 2, 4, and 5 of the Act. It is not
found in any other Act or draft.
It will be evident that the Uniform Act affords a model or draft
statute which is capable of adaptation to the procedure already
existing in the various states. Those states conferring on their
courts a liberal rule-making authority may confine their statutes to
section one or at most to sections one and two and incorporate the
remainder of the sections of the Uniform Act in rules of court.
States whose courts do not possess such power can adopt the whole
Act, with but slight modifications to fit local conditions, as a statute
amending their practice acts or codes of procedure or otherwise.
British and continental practice has demonstrated that the
courts have not exhausted their usefulness by the employment of
their curative functions, but that there remains a large field for the
application of their preventive functions which in this country
has barely been touched. Under the procedure authorizing declara-
tory judgments, with its simplicity, its capacity to serve important
ends of corrective justice without legal hostilities, its utility in
deciding many questions which cannot now be brought to judicial
cognizance, and its efficacy in removing uncertainty from legal
relations before it has ripened into a bitter litigation, the American
public may look forward to a more amicable and simple method of




3 Supra, note 13.
